THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW by unknown
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
VOL. XV. NOVEMBER, 1905 No. i
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW.*
One of the most useful results of our recent territorial ex-
pansion for those who have had to do with uniting our new pos-
sessions with this country and adjusting certain of the Spanish
codes which we found in force in Porto Rico and the Philippines.
to the new American sovereignty, has been the comparative
study made necessary of the two great systems of law-the
Roman, or Civil Law, and the Anglo-Saxon, or Common Law.
It must be admitted that those of us who have been educated in
the principles of the common law and have not extended our
study much into general jurisprudence, are apt to be narrow in
our prejudices in favor of the common law and are prone to think
that there is very little for us to learn from the civil law which
can be usefully adopted by a government in which the liberty of
the individual is held so sacred and the power of the government
towards the subject or the citizen is restrained by such careful
regulations as in England, in America or any of the popular self-
governments for which either of those countries is responsible.
But certainly when in actual practice the common law lawyer
is brought to the study of the beautifully imple and exactly
comprehensive language of the civil code governing the rights
between individuals, he begins to feel the veneration that comes
from consciously viewing the work of twenty centuries of jurists
and law-givers who have been struggling during all that period
to simplify and make lucid the rules of law and to reduce it to
the science that under the civil code it certainly has become.
When he comes to an examination of the political or govern-
* This article was given as a commencement address at the Law School,
Yale University, June 26, i9o5.
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mental theory of the civil law, he finds more reason for his pride
in, and love of, the common law in this, that under the civil law
the state seems a separate entity, different from the people who
constitute it, different from the individual who comes into contact
with it-an entity whose interest is to be more guarded and
protected than that of any other in the community and for the
welfare of this entity it is the principle of the civil law that the
interest of the individual must yield, while at the common law
the theory is that the state is but an aggregation of the individuals,
a great partnership in which he has a voice. In the common law,
the spirit manifested in the rule caveat ermtor-that every man
must look after himself-leaves blunt and harsh results (where
actual and affirmative fraud is not committed) which the civil law
would ameliorate by requiring one individual to treat the other
with more equity, with more morality one may say, with more
care that the other shall not by his own neglect, lose his rights.
There is more of paternalism in the civil law-more care for the
subject by the government-less disposition to let individuals
work out their rights between them. The common law stands
for the utmost liberty of the individual, and as a price of this lib-
erty it imposes upon the person enjoying it, the burden of looking
out for himself.
When we leave the subject of civil rights and come to the
punishment of the individual for offenses against the state, we
find in the civil law greater anxiety that the state should be pro-
tected against crime, than we do in the common law. The civil
lawyer looks at the crime more from the standpoint of the govern-
ment than from that of the individual, and more from the im-
portance to the community that crime shall be not only punished
but prevented, while there runs all through the common law the
anxiety that the prosecution of crime may not be used by the
government to oppress the individual, and that there shall
be thrown about the individual safeguards so great as to
give impression that at common law the liberty of the individual
is on the whole of greater importance than the safety of the com-
munity from crime. Of course, between the trend of the one
system and the trend of the other is the golden mean of the legis-
lator and government maker by which shall be secured the pro-
tection of society without the oppression of the individual.
When the common law lawyer faces the problem of reform-
ing the criminal laws and procedure of a country that has hereto-
fore been governed by the civil law, he feels certain that here at
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least is room for a wholesome change and the introduction into
the patient of a very large dose of the principles which lie at 
the
-foundation of the prosecution of crime and are supposed 
to in-
volve the protection of the rights of civil liberty in the individual.
The institution of the writ of habeas corpus which, though a
civil process, and not a criminal action, is generally used to 
test
the validity of some pretended criminal process, is attended with
unmixed good. The principle that no man shall be confined save
under due legal process is as well known to the civil as 
to the
common law, but the difference between the two systems 
from a
political and practical standpoint, is well illustrated in respect 
to
the enforcement of the principle. At the civil law the rule 
that
no man shall be illegally confined is operative upon the conscience
of the judges and the jailors, and if their consciences do not 
move
them, the poor prisoner and his friends are without a 
remedy.
At the common law the prisoner or his friends has the practical
remedy of the writ, which being of high privilege he may 
obtain
for the asking of any judge, who runs the risk of incurring 
the
heaviest penalty himself if he refuse. This is but one of 
the
many instances in which our Anglo-Saxon ancestors hammered
out their civil liberty by securing from their would-be royal 
op-
pressors not general declarations of principles of freedom 
like a
French constitution, but distinct and definite promises that 
cer-
tain rules, not of substantive, but of adjective law should obtain.
To them, it was the securing of the means by which they 
could
themselves secure their liberty, that must be preserved, for 
with
the machinery at hand, with the procedure available there was 
no
difficulty in maintaining the ultimate object, civil rights and 
lib-
erty. Run through the Magna Charta of 1215, the Petition 
of
Right of 1625, and the Bill of Rights of x688, the great charters
of English liberty, and find in them an insistence not on general
principles, but on procedure. Take the most comprehensive-
"' No man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law "-this does not attempt to define the cases 
in
which a man shall be entitled to life, liberty and property, 
but
points to, and insists upon the necessity for a legal procedure 
by
which it shall be done.
Then the requirement that no man shall be convicted save
by a jury of his peers. That again is mere procedure. So, too,
that he shall be informed of the accusation against him, that 
he
shall be confronted by the witnesses, that he shall not be 
com-
pelled to testify in a criminal case against himself, that he 
shall
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not be convicted of treason save by evidence of two witnesses tothe overt act; that he shall not be subject to unreasonable searches;that he shall not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
that the right of petition shall not be denied-all these are butinstances of judicial or other procedure, by which general andultimate rights could be maintained and protected. An Anglo-
Saxon had but little use for declarations of abstract principles thatrested for their preservation on the consciences of their rulers.The means for securing civil rights and preserving the indi-
vidual from the oppression of the government which I have men-tioned above, have been embodied by the Federal and State con-stitutions and as they served their purposes so well in ancienttimes when the battle for civil liberty was fought and won, thefirst impulse of the American lawyer is to apply them all as a pan-acea to the government and criminal procedure of our new pos-sessions. But further investigation, with a deepening sense ofresponsibility for the government of a body of people whose wel-fare has been forced upon us as a sacred trust, leads to a much
more conservative attitude in respect of the needed changes in theexisting procedure. We cannot escape a re-examination of thereasons for the constitutional limitations I have been discussing.
We must cease to regard them as fetishes to be worshipped with-out reason, and simply because they are. We must follow themto their source, trace their development and elaboration or modi-fication due to contemporaneous needs, and determine whethertheir existence to-day is due rather to a veneration for the greatuse they served in the past than to any present utility. We have
no right to force on the Porto Ricans or the Filipinos, institutions
of our own which have proved of the highest benefit to us, unless
we can see, on other than mere sentimental grounds connected
with our own history, that such institutions will now prove bene-
ficial to them in their present condition.
The great bulwark and protection of the individual at com-mon law against the power of the government and the king, ex-erted through judges removable at will in criminal prosecutions
for political offenses, was trial by jury. I have no time, even ifI could do so, to trace the growth of this venerable tribunal froma mere collection of individuals in the vicinage who were gener-ally witnesses of the facts they were assembled to adjudge, to thepresent body of twelve persons selected from the community in
which the crime is committed, but required to be impartial andso wholly without knowledge of the facts as witnesses.
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Suffice it to say that as an effect of the trend toward civil
liberty and popular rights in the French Revolution and the up-
risings of x848, the trial by jury in criminal cases was adopted in
France, in Belgium, in Germany, in Norway and Sweden, in
Spain, in Italy, and Russia except in trials for political offenses,
and is now in use in those countries. This constitutes a tribute
to its value as an institution in countries in which it did not have
its beginning and growth, and perhaps would furnish a solid rea-
son for our adopting it in Porto Rico and the Philippines. It has
been adopted in Porto Rico. It has not been adopted in the
Philippines. I do not think it too much to say, however, that it
has proven to be a failure thus far in Porto Rico.
The first question was in the Philippines, shall it be adopted
in civil cases? No civil law country, I think, has adopted it for
this purpose. Shall we do so? It would seem unwise. In the
first place, it is by no means clear that in our own jurisprudence
trial by jury in civil cases is an unmixed good. Itis true that in
the Federal Constitution the right of trial by jury in cases at
common law involving more than twenty dollars is secured by
fundamental mandate in all courts of the United States. But
when we examine as a whole the civil litigation in our courts, we
find the tendency is toward trial without a jury in all cases but
suits for personal injury against corporations. In respect to jury
trials in civil actions in Anglo-American law, we find one of those
anomalies, entirely illogical, but easily explainable on historical
grounds, that would disgust a civilian, which only endears the
system to one of Anglo-Saxon origin and education.
When an Anglo-Saxon wished to mend his structure of juris-
prudence, he merely added a room where it was needed without
any regard to the general symmetrical appearance of the building,
and with the addition of many rooms for various reasons, other
parts have become useless, but remain to testify to the history of
the growth of the structure. Much more than half the civil suits
now brought are what would have been called actions in equity
before the modern state codes of procedure had united common
law actions and equitable actions in one form called a civil action.
Equity, as you know, was a system of remedial procedure which
grew up side by side with the ordinary common law practice and
was instituted in early days by the King to whom appeals were
made against the rigors and injustices of his own courts. He dele-
gated to the Lord-keeper of his great seal, then usually an eccle-
siastic, the power to moderate the severity and inelasticity of the
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common law methods, and the ecclesiastic statesman, nothingloath
to exercise power for the glory of his masters, Divine and tem-
poral, introduced methods of remedial justice which he derived
from the canon law and the ecclesiastical courts. With this be-
ginning came the great body of equity jurisprudence which, as Isay, is the basis for a large majority of the civil suits brought
to-day, certainly if suits for personal injury against corporations
are excluded. In suits in equity the Judge hears and decides the
issues of fact. The issues may be, and often are, very similar to
those arising in suits at common law, the genuineness of a signa-
ture, the existence of fraudulent motive, the identity of an indi-
vidual, damages to business by violation of patents, trade marks
or contract rights and all the variety of issues presented in civil
litigation. Now the Federal Constitution requires that such
issues arising at common law shall be tried by a jury, but if in an
an equity suit the court may try them. Since the abolition of the
distinction between law and equity in civil actions in our codes of
procedure, it requires a lawyer to tell whether a suit brought is in
equity or law. Certainly a constitutional mandate that requires a
jury in less than half the civil issues, and only in those when in a
certain form of action, distinguishable only by a lawyer, can
hardly be said to rest on any very broad and sound principles.
Of course, in suits for personal injury against corporations, the
plaintiff relies on the supposed sympathy of twelve laymen with
the poor plaintiff against the rich corporation, both to find the
facts in favor of the plaintiff and also to swell the damages to a
large sum. But this hardly constitutes a reason for maintaining
the jury in a system which is supposed to dispense justice to all,
whether rich or poor, impartially. The abolition of the jury in
civil cases would relieve the public of a great burden of expense,
would facilitate the hearing of all civil suits and would not, I
think, with proper appeal deprive any litigant of all he is entitled
to, an impartial hearing. Of course, it will never be done in
courts of the United States, and perhaps never in any of the
states, although in some of them the tendency is strong in that
direction. However this may be in view of present conditions,
we are not called upon to introduce the jury in civil cases into the
Philippines.
In the matter of the criminal procedure, the question is very
different.
In a country where a part of the judges are aliens it would
add much to the satisfaction of the people if a part of the judicial
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tribunal were made up of a jury of natives, and, if this were con-
sistent with the safety of the community, those responsible for
the new government would certainly introduce the jury system in
the trial of crimes. The whole theory of the trial by jury is that,
out of the body of the community, you may select at haphazard
twelve men who will be so deeply impressed with the necessity of
punishing crime on the one hand and of allowing innocent defend-
ants to escape on the other hand, that they will decide truly and
justly as between the community and the defendant. The system
assumes a sense of responsibility in the ordinary citizen subject to
jury duty for the good working of the government and for the
interests of society at large, which will overcome the natural dis-
position to avoid inflicting punishment on another, and will enable
the jury to find the verdict as the law and evidence shall require.
Manifestly such a tribunal would have no place among an igno-
rant people, or indeed, even among a people who are somewhat
educated, if they have not inculcated in them a sense of responsi-
bility for, and of sharing in, the government. Such people are
likely to prove unworthy jurors and to be affected in all their ver-
dicts by their emotions and by every other motive than that which
should control them, to wit: the well-being of society. It is this
sense of justice which is implanted naturally in the Anglo-Saxon
breast, but which is absent in the Porto Rican and the Filipino.
Its absence disqualifies either from filling the measure of stiffness
and conservativeness of character required to make a proper
juryman.
Another difficulty involved in introducing the jury system
into the Philippine Islands, and, indeed, into any civil law coun-
try, is the absence of a code of evidence without which the jury
system is not likely greatly to promote just findings on issues pre-
sented. In the Anglo-American law there is an extensive series
of rules governing the admission of evidence, which now may
'almost be called a code of evidence, which has its origin, as Pro-
fessor Thayer of Harvard so clearly shows, in the necessity for
protecting the jury in its consideration of issues brought before
it, from being led astray and misled by evidence of a kind likely
to have greater power of persuasion than judges and men of
affairs from wide experience thought it ought to have. Some of
the rules of evidence seem arbitrary, but generally the rules of
relevancy and competency are based upon long experience in
human affairs. It is judge-made law which has been worked out,
as Professor Thayer shows, to meet the exigencies of a trial by
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laymen not experienced in hearing cases, who could not, with
everything allowed to be presented to them, winnow the wheat
from the chaff. The civil law has no such code. The question
whether evidence is relevant to an issue and will assist in its de-
cision, is largely a matter in the discretion of the judges in hear-
ings at the civil law. We can well remember the astonishment
and almost horror that thrilled this country during the second
trial of Dreyfus before the court martial, when witnesses were
allowed to testify to all sorts of hearsay tending to show Dreyfus
guilty, and French generals were allowed to go before the court
and testify with their hands on their hearts of their conviction
that Dreyfus was guilty, without really having any personal
knowledge on the subject at all. I am not prepared to say that
the Dreyfus trial did not go beyond what is ordinarily permitted
in a French court. I think it did. But I am very certain that
no such rules of evidence as obtain in our procedure are known to
the civil law countries of Europe, unless adopted within very
recent years. It has been necessary for use in the Philippine
Islands to introduce a code of evidence for the trial of crimes even
without a jury, which is also applicable to the trial of civil cases.
By order of President McKinley all the constitutional protections
to the defendant in a criminal case were extended to defendants
in criminal cases in the Philippines, except the right of trial by
jury.
I am not certain that in a new country this was entirely wise.
When examined as an original proposition, the prohibition that
the defendant in a criminal case shall not be compelled to testify
seems, in some aspects, to be of doubtful utility. If the adminis-
tration of criminal law is for the purpose of convicting those who
are guilty of crime, then it seems natural to follow in such a pro-
cess the methods that obtain in ordinary life. If anything has
happened and it is important to discover who is the author of it,
the first impulse of the human mind is to inquire of the person
suspected, whether he did it, and to cross-examine him as to the
circumstances. Certainly this is the domestic rule by which your
wife or your mother proceeds to find out who it is that broke the
window, who it is that stole the jam from the pantry, or why it
is that the sweeping has not been done by the person charged
with that duty. She goes to the suspected culprit and asks the
questions natural under such circumstances, to see whether her
suspicion of guilt is well founded. Now the proposition that it is
unjust to call upon the person suspected of a crime to tell of his
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connection with it is'at first sight untenable. Why is it unjust?
If he is not guilty will he not have the strongest motive for say-
ing so, and, if he is guilty and seeks to escape liability, will he
not use every effort to make his conduct consistent with his inno-
cence? Why, then, does it expose the defendant to improper
treatment if an officer of the law at once begins to interrogate him
concerning his guilt. But the answer is, he has the right to con-
sult counsel. He should not be hurried into statements which he
may subsequently desire to retract. In other words, he should
be given an opportunity after he has committed the crime to
frame in his mind some method by which he can escape convic-
tion and punishment. I am inclined to think that the expression,
"No person shall be compelled to testify against himself," if
traced back to its original source, had reference to a system of
torture which did prevail in the time of the early English kings,
and which was intended to denounce, not the mere calling of a
defendant to testify and inviting him by questions so to do, but
the actual compulsion of evidence by physical means. Now, as
Bentham shows, the principle does not include compulsion; it is
construed to mean that, before the jury or tribunal trying the de-
fendant, he may not be called upon to answer questions. Ben-
tham's criticism of this rule is well known. He says it can only
be supported by the fox-hunter's reason-that it is right that the
criminal or the fox should have a little start, and this advantage
in the beginning, in favor of the defendant and against the state,
is the refusal of the law to allow the state to call the defendant to
prove its case. It makes the conviction of the criminal a game
which is played out under certain rules, and the interests of soci-
ety are lost sight of. At common law, the defendant was not
allowed to testify, even if he would, but that rule was found to
work harshly against innocent men who, going on the stand,
might explain the suspicious circumstances connecting them with
the crime and show their innocence, so that the rule for years in
this country, and very recently in England, is that the defendant
may take the stand if he will, but, if he fails to take the stand, the
counselor for the prosecution may not comment on his failure to
do so., The result of the change has been, I think, to lead to
more convictions than before, for a jury may be charged as ex-
plicitly as possible to disregard the fact that the defendant does
not go on the stand, but it is impossible to eradicate in the minds
of sensible men the impression that, if one who is charged with
the crime, refuses to explain by his own evidence that he was
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not guilty, that the reason for his so doing is because he is afraid
he cannot so explain.
Another principle of the law of evidence embodied in the
constitutional limitations is that the defendant must be confronted
with the witnesses who testify against him. This seems to im-
pose unnecessary hardship upon the government, because it cer-
tainly would not injure the defendant if depositions were taken
and the defendant or his counsel were permitted to cross-examine.
It is a case of undue tenderness toward the defendant. There is
no such restriction upon the defendant when he is seeking to prove
his innocence, for he may use depositions without number.
The limitation upon unreasonable searches is another consti-
tutional restriction which has been used to save men from convic-
tion. Indeed, uniting that with the one preventing the court or
prosecutor from interrogating the defendant as to his guilt, makes
it impossible in some classes of cases to convict persons well
known tor be guilty. It is the great shield which the powerful
and unlawful trusts and violators of the interstate commerce laws
have to prevent their successful prosecution. It prevents the use
of process to obtain books and papers in which the defendant has
violated the law or has recorded statements showing guilt. Our
Supreme Courts, generally, instead of restricting the operation of
these constitutional limitations, have given them, whenever occa-
sion arose, a wider scope than the letter of the limitation seemed
to require, in the interest, it was said, of the liberty of the indi-
vidual.
Then there is the general rule that the guilt of the defend-
ant, in order to justify conviction, must be shown beyond a reason-
able doubt. This is a fair and proper rule, and has usually been
regarded as the other side of the rule that the defendant is pre-
sumed to be innocent. But the Supreme Court of the United
States has recently carried it to such a point by construction as
to treat the presumption of innocence not as being only the mere
counterpart of this rule, but even as substantive evidence, and
as the equivalent of a witness testifying affirmatively, and contin-
uing to testify from the beginning to the end of the case in favor
of the innocence of the defendant, a construction not sustained
by Professor Thayer, and seemingly much enlarging the previous
operation of the presumption of innocence, all out of tenderness
to the defendant. These rules, and others, intending to make it as
difficult as possible to convict a defendant, were the result of the
savage character of the common law of crimes when the defend-
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-ant was not allowed counsel, and there were one hundred and sixty
capital offences at common law. The judges, of course, being
men and having pity, sometimes seized the opportunity them-
selves to act as counsel for the defendant, and introduced the
rules which we have alluded to and maintained them in the inter-
est of mercy. They have been moderated a very little, although
the reason for them has long passed away. Defendants are now
allowed counsel, and, if unable to pay counsel, the state employs
counsel to defend them.
Therefore, I say that if a jurist from Mars were to come
down to earth and be charged with the duty of framing a crimi-
nal code which should reach the golden mean between preserving
the interests of society by punishing and preventing crime on the
one hand and saving the individual charged with crime from lia-
bility of unjust conviction on the other, I think it doubtful
whether he would adopt the constitutional restrictions which I
have been discussing. The general law of evidence, especially
that which excludes hearsay, can well be defended on grounds of
general policy, for though hearsay at times might convict in
proper cases where its exclusion acquits, cross-examination is such
a searcher of the truth that the wisdom of ever admitting hearsay
evidence as the basis for the conviction of crime may well be
doubted.
. In adopting a system such as we have been considering for
the punishment of crime for a new country, the first and most
apt question which can be asked is, "How have these so-called
guarantees of liberty of the defendant worked on the whole."
While in England-in which all these restrictions are still observed-
crime is punished with as much severity and uniformity as the
public weal demands, and this, although they have the trial by
jury, although the defendant cannot be compelled to testify, and
although all the other rules of evidence to which I have referred,
have full application, how is it in this country? I grieve for
my country to say that the administration of the criminal law in
all the states in the Union (there may be one or. two exceptions)
is a disgrace to our civilization. We are now reaching an age
when we cannot plead youth, sparse civilization, newness of coun-
try, as a cause for laxity in the enforcement of law.
What makes the difference between the administration of the
criminal law in England and in this country? In the first place,
while the jurybas always been a sacred and untouched part of the
tribunal constituted to try crimes in England, the judges upon the
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court have always taken and maintained their part at common
law in the trial of every defendant, and that part has been, first,
the retention of complete control over the method by which
counsel try the case, restraining them to the points at issue and
preventing them from diverting the minds of the jury to inconse-
quential and irrelevant circumstances and considerations, and,
second, the power to aid the jury by advising them how to con-
sider the evidence and expressing an opinion upon the evidence,
leaving, however, to the jury the ultimate decision. In this way
the sophistical rhetoric and sentimental appeals of counsel are
made to lose their misleading effect, and the jurors are brought
to a sense of their responsibility in deciding the actual issues of
fact as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant upon the evi-
dence before them.
Another reason why English justice still maintains its reputa-
tion for certainty of punishment is the fact that there are no ap-
peals allowed from the trial in the first court unless the judge pre-
siding in the court shall deem certain questions of law of sufficient
importance and doubt to reserve them to a court of crown cases
reserved. When, therefore, after a long or a short trial the de-
fendant is convicted, the conviction is final in ninety-nine cases
out of a hundred.
A possible third reason is to be found in the ability of the
English court to secure the best character of men in either a com-
mon or a special jury-men charged with the earnest responsibility
for the enforcement of the law.
How is it in our own country? We find that these constitu-
tional limitations adopted centuries ago in tenderness to the de-
fendant and which have to some extent outlived their usefulness,
because the reasons for their adoption have ceased to be, have
been elaborated in their scope and operation, not only by the
court, but also by the legislatures, because thought to be in the
interest of liberty. And this has made them greater obstacles in
the conviction of the guilty. The institution of trial by jury has
come to be regarded as fetish to such an extent that state legisla-
tures have exalted the power of the jury and diminished the power
of the court in the tribunal made up of both for the hearing of
criminal cases. Although the judiciary of nearly all the states is
now elective, legislatures have seemed to resent any intervention
by the judge in the trial of the cause beyond a very colorless and
abstract statement of the law to be applied to the case. It is
manifestly impossible for a judge to instruct a jury in the law
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well and possess it of the law as applied to the facts without dis-
cussing the facts in detail, and without commenting on them.
But so jealous have legislatures become of the influence of the
court upon the jury that it is now, in most states, made an error
of law for the court to express his opinion upon the facts, although
he leaves the ultimate decision, of course, to the jury. It fre-
quently is the case that, under the statute, the judge is required to
write his charge and discuss the abstract principles applicable in
the case, and that then the counsel are permitted to discuss the
law of the case in view -of the judge's charge and apply the facts.
The opportunity which this gives the counsel to pervert the law,
and the wide scope which the system in restricting the judge
gives to the jury of following its own sweet will, of course,
doubles the opportunity for miscarriages of justice. The func-
tion of the judge is limited to that of the moderator in a religious
assembly. The law throws the reins on the back of the jury, and
the verdict becomes rather the vote of a town meeting than the
sharp, clear decision of the tribunal of justice. The counsel for
the defense, relying on the diminished power of the court, creates,
by dramatic art and by harping on the importance of unimportant
details, a false atmosphere in the court room which the judge is
powerless to dispel, and under the hypnotic influence of which
the counsel is able to lead the jurors to vote as jurors for a ver-
dict which, after all the excitement of the trial has passed away,
they are unable to support as men.
Another cause already alluded to is the difficulty of securing
jurors properly sensible of the duty which they are summoned to
perform. In the extreme tenderness the state legislatures exhibit
toward persons accused as criminals, and especially as murderers,
they allow peremptory challenges to the defendant far in excess
of those allowed to the state. In my own state of Ohio for a long
time the law was that the state was allowed two peremptory chal-
lenges and the defendant twenty-three in capital cases. This
very great discrepancy between the two sides of the case allowed
the defendant's counsel to eliminate from all panels every man
of force and character and standing in the community, and to
assemble a collection in the jury box of nondescripts of no char-
acter, weak and amenable to every breeze of emotion, however
maudlin or irrelevant to the issue.
I do not think that the members of the bar can escape the re-
sponsibility for the demoralizing tendency of the legislatures to
wrest from the judges in the criminal procedure the conserving
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power which they ought to retain and which they had at common
law and to exalt the jury's power beyond anything which is wise
or prudent, ,and to extend to the defendant the opportunity to re-
ject all good men from the jury and to select the weak, the unin
telligent and the irresponsible. The perversions of justice in my
own city of Cincinnati and state of Ohio in 1884, led to the ap-
pointment of a committee of the bar to visit the legislature to
see whether it was not possible to rid our criminal code of proce-
dure of those features which placed the prosecution at great dis-
advantage in the trial of capital cases. The indignation of the
public had led to a mob and to the burning of our court house
and it was thought that the time had come for some more active
members of the community to organize and see if reform could
not be effected. I had the honor of being one of those who
waited upon the judiciary committee of the Ohio legislature and
preferred the request, that the twenty-three challenges allowed
to the defendant be reduced to twelve, and that the state be
allowed a similar number, but we found that there were upon that
committee lawyers, a substantial part of whose practice consisted
in acting as counsel for the defendants in important criminal trials.
When I protested that twenty-three challenges was an outrageous
number, the chairman of the committee leaned back with the re-
mark, "Many a time have I seen when I would have given all my
fee to have had twenty-four challenges for the defendant." I
cite this instance because I believe that the unjust disposition
to curtail the power of judges, to exalt the power of the jury, to
subject them to influences that ought to control them, and to give
opportunity to the defendant's counsel to manipulate the selection
of juries by the use of peremptory challenges is due, more or less,
to the intervention of some members of the bar whose practice is
more or' less beneficially affected, as they conceive, by these obsta-
cles to the course of justice.
The third reason for the distinction between the enforce-
ment of law in England and in this country is to be found in
the right of appeal which is given in every criminal case and in
many cases the appeal is to two courts. The code of evidence
with its complicated rules, the technical statutory limitations
supposed to be in favor of the defendant, and all used as a trap
to catch the trial court in some error, however technical, upon
which in appellate proceedings a reversal of the judgment of the
court below may be asked. The rule which obtains throughout
this country is that any error, how ver small, which it is impos-
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sible to show affirmatively did not prejudice the defendant must
lead to reversal of the judgment. The same disposition on the
part of the courts to think that every provision of every rule of
law in favor of the defendant is one to be strictly enforced, and
even widened in its effect in the interest of the liberty of the
citizen, has led courts of appeal to a degree of refinement in up-
holding technicalities in favor of defendants, and in reversing
convictions that render one who has had practical knowledge of
the trial of criminal cases most impatient.
In a case carried on error to the Supreme Court of the
United States, the point was raised for the first time in the
Supreme Court that the record did not show an arraignment
of the defendant and a plea of not guilty, and on this ground
the court, three judges dissenting, reversed the case. There
was not a well founded doubt in that case that the defendant
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The perusal of the rec-
ord raised this as a presumption of fact and the judgment was
reversed although there was not a pretense that the defendant
had suffered any injury by reason of the alleged defect of the
character in question. When a court of highest authority in this
country thus interposes a bare technicality between a defen-
dant and his just conviction, it is not too much to charge some
of the laxity in our administration of the criminal law to a
proneness on the part of courts of last resort to find error and
to reverse judgments of conviction.
And now what has been the result in this country? Criminal
statistics are exceedingly difficult to obtain. The number of
homicides one can note from the daily newspapers, the number
of lynchings and the number of executions, but the number of
indictments, trials, convictions, acquittals or miss-trials it is
hard to find. Since 1885 in the United States there have been
x31,95i murders and homicides, and there have been 2,286 exe-
cutions. In i885 the number of murders was ,,8o8. In 1904 it
had increased to 8,482. The number of executions in x885 was
io8. In 1904 it was 1x6. This startling increase in the number
of murders and homicides as compared with the number of exe-
cntions tells the story. As murder is on the increase, so are all
offenses of the felony class, and there can be no doubt that they
will continue to increase unless the criminal laws are enforccd
with more certainty, more uniformity, mere severity than they
now are.
Certainly the result of the American criminal procedure as
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distinguished from the English criminal procedure does not en-
courage us to think that it would be wise to introduce in the
Philippine Islands a system of jury trial which now prevails in
most of the states, especially under the restrictions of the power
of the court which we find as we go west in this country. The
cure for this growing cancer in the body politic is more practi-
cal and more available than most public evils because it may be
found in statutory amendments. If laws could be passed either
abolishing the right of criminal appeal and leaving to the par-
doning power, as it is in England, the correction of judicial
wrong, or instead of that, if appeals must be allowed, then if a
provision of law could be enacted by which no judgment of the
court below should be reversed except for an error which the
court after reading the entire evidence can affirmatively say
would have led to a different verdict, ninety-nine reversals out
of one hundred under the present system would be avoided.
Second, if the power of the court by statute to advise the
jury, to comment and express its opinion to the jury upon the
facts in every criminal case could be restored, and if the state
and the defendant were deprived of peremptory challenges in the
selection of a jury, twenty-five per cent of those trials which
are now miscarriages of justice would result in the conviction
of the guilty defendant, and that which has become a mere game
in which the defendant's counsel play with loaded dice, would
resume its office of a serious judicial investigation into the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. I presume it is useless to expect
that courts will turn from their present tendency to amplyfy
technicalities in behalf of defendants until legislatures shall
initiate the change by the broad limitation already suggested
upon the powers of the- court to reverse the judgment of the
court below. Our country is disgusted by the number of lynch-
ings that occur both in the north and in the south, and excuses
are sought for the horrible and fiendish cruelties perpetrated by
mobs in such cases in some other cause than the delays of jus-
tice. Instances are cited of where the mob has executcd men
whom they had every reason to believe were about to be justly
punished under the law, to show that an improvement in the
criminal procedure would not prevent lynchings. But every
man of affairs who has studied the subject at all knows that if
men who commit crime were promptly arrested and convicted
there would be no mob for the purpose of lynching. A mob,
after it has organized, loses all conscience and cannot be con-
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trolled, but it is the delays of justice that leads to its organiza-
tion. Nothing but a radical inprovement in our administration
of criminal law will prevent the growth in the number cf
lynchings in the United States that bring the blush of shame to
every lover of his country.
William H. Taft.
